This article investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework where agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' learning rates are private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over-or underexploited crucially depends on whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). We further show that an overexploitation of learning effects can occur also if the full-commitment assumption is relaxed.
Introduction
That private knowledge on technology is a key issue in regulatory practice has been a central theme in the literature for years (see Baron and Myerson, 1982 and the influential work by Laffont and Tirole, 1993) . Although we already have a fairly good understanding of optimal regulation in stationary settings, relatively little is still known about dynamic aspects of regulation and the interplay between regulation and innovation incentives when technology is endogenous. This is particularly unfortunate because innovation plays a prominent role in many traditional fields of government regulation such as telecommunications or electric utilities. In such industries, adequate regulatory practice should invariably take account of its dynamic impact on innovation.
This article contributes to closing this gap by considering a well-documented kind of innovation: innovation through "learning by doing." 1 Under learning by doing, the regulator's task is to induce a level of production which takes careful account of future costs savings through learning effects. In the tradition of the recent literature on regulation, this article explores the challenge posed to the regulator when firms enjoy superior information also on this aspect of their technology.
We investigate this issue in a general principal-agent model where, in each period, a principal (the regulatory authority) procures a good from an agent (the regulated firm) in exchange for a monetary transfer. To capture learning effects, production costs are assumed to depend on the previous period's level of production, where the extent of this learning effect is known only to the agent.
Our principal finding is that whether private information causes learning effects to be underor overexploited relative to the full-information benchmark crucially depends on how agents' learning potential and their absolute level of efficiency are related: if learning permits inherently more efficient agents to expand their lead over less efficient agents, then learning effects will be underexploited. If, however, learning allows inherently less efficient agents to catch up, then learning effects will be overexploited.
The basic intuition for this result is simple: by the familiar rent-efficiency tradeoff, distortions in output are driven by the principal's incentive to limit the rent payable to more efficient agents, which in turn corresponds to their cost advantage over less efficient agents. If learning magnifies efficiency differences, the usual downward distortion results. However, if learning leads less efficient agents to catch up, the cost advantage enjoyed by more efficient agents decreases with first-period output, in which case upward distortions result. Moreover, we show that downward distortions in the former case may in fact be so strong as to induce a level of production which is inefficiently low even from a static point of view (i.e., ignoring dynamic learning effects).
These results are all developed in detail under the assumption that the principal can fully commit to contracts spanning both periods of production. In a further step, we investigate the robustness of our key findings to settings in which commitment is limited. Although the analytics become less tractable in this case, we are able to show that even if the principal is limited to offering spot contracts, an overexploitation of learning effects may result.
To the best of our knowledge, many of our insights-particularly the possibility of learning effects being overexploited-are new to the regulation and procurement literature. In the most immediately related article, Lewis and Yildirim (2002a) (see also Lewis and Yildirim, 2002b ) also investigate the regulation of a privately informed monopolist who learns by doing. Two of their key findings are the following. First, learning effects will always be underexploited relative to a dynamically efficient benchmark. Second, however, learning effects will never be left unexploited altogether in the sense that output will nonetheless always exceed its statically efficient level.
The difference with our findings can be explained by thinking of learning effects in terms of a cost and a benefit side-costs being higher output today, and benefits being lower production costs tomorrow. Lewis and Yildirim's model focuses on private information only on the cost side: the regulator does not know the costs of raising output today, but he knows the impact which this will have on tomorrow's costs. 2 In contrast, our model introduces asymmetric information on the benefit side by supposing that the firm is privately informed on its learning rate, that is, on the extent to which higher output today translates into lower costs tomorrow. Our analysis shows that the aforementioned two key results of the previous literature are both sensitive to this aspect of private information.
On a more basic level, this article's contribution may also be understood as sharpening basic economic intuition concerning the connection between asymmetric information and the volume of trade: it has become a virtual commonplace to associate private information with inefficiently low trade. Our results bring back to mind that this intuition depends crucially on the presumption that increased trade exacerbates the value of private information and thereby informational rents. Although this structure arises naturally in many models, we argue that learning by doing provides a case in point where it is just as natural for the reverse to be true.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a basic two-period model of learning by doing and describes the full-information benchmark. Section 3 presents the optimal contract under asymmetric information and full commitment. We discuss both its efficiency properties, whether it makes use of learning effects in the first place, and present a number of extensions and generalizations. Section 4 in turn investigates contracts under spot commitment. We derive some basic properties of the optimal spot contract, discuss the role of first-period information revelation under spot commitment, and show by means of a numerical example that the main insights of Section 3-particularly the possibility of inefficiently high trade-generalize to the case of spot commitment. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of the results and further possible applications of the general principal-agent structure considered in this article.
A simple model of learning by doing
This section presents the basic model and, as a benchmark for our later analysis, characterizes the efficient allocation. Setting up the model. We consider a simple model in which a principal procures a good from an agent over two periods t ∈ {1, 2}. Let q t ∈ Q t denote the quantity of the good procured in period t and let z t ∈ R denote the monetary transfer from the principal to the agent in that period. Unless stated differently, we let Q t ≡ R 0 . In each period t, let the principal's utility be given by v t = S(q t ) − z t , where S > 0 and S < 0. The principal discounts at rate δ ∈ (0, 1), overall utility from transactions over the two periods being V = v 1 + δv 2 . The agent's utility in each period t is u t = z t − C t , where C t denotes his costs of production in that period. The agent discounts at the same rate δ, leading to an overall utility of U = u 1 + δu 2 . Both principal and agent are assumed to be risk neutral. 3 The remaining assumptions detail the agent's production technology and its dependence on private information (we discuss numerous relaxations of these assumptions in the context of contracts under full commitment in Section 3). Private information is represented by the scalar θ (the agent's "type"), which is drawn from a commonly known distribution over , and which the agent privately observes prior to first-period production (and prior to contracting). For simplicity, most of our analysis will assume two types = {θ, θ} with θ > θ and Prob(θ = θ ) = ν.
In each period t, total costs of production C t as a function of output and type take the form C 1 (q 1 , θ) = c 1 (θ )q 1 and C 2 (q 1 , q 2 , θ) = c 2 (q 1 , θ)q 2 .
( 1 )
Thus, we assume that production costs in each period are linear in (contemporaneous) output, and dependent on the agent's type θ . Crucially, to capture the presence of learning effects, we assume that second-period marginal costs depend on output produced in the first period. Particularly, we assume ∂c 2 /∂q 1 < 0: the higher, first-period production, the lower the marginal costs of production in period 2 (for any given type θ ). 4 Next, we assume ∂c 1 /∂θ 0 and ∂c 2 /∂θ < 0 for all q 1 . Thus, an agent with a higher θ is more efficient in that he produces any output schedule q = (q 1 , q 2 ) at a lower cost. This assumption will provide a key sorting condition in the ensuing analysis.
We call |∂c 2 /∂q 1 | the agent's learning rate, and say that an agent learns faster if he has a higher learning rate. Note that an agent may learn faster even though he is less efficient (i.e., has a lower θ ). Indeed, key aspects of our analysis will crucially depend on whether learning rates increase or decrease in θ . To facilitate this, we assume that learning rates either increase or decrease in θ for all q 1 . Figure 1 illustrates the relevant constellations.
The following example not only provides an illustration of the setup but-due to its analytical tractability-will prove useful for numerical examples given further below.
3 Letting principal and agent share the same risk attitude and time preference focuses our analysis by avoiding motives to trade risk or intertemporal utility. 4 Note that we assume marginal costs to be constant within each period but change discontinuously from one period to the next. This assumption serves to isolate learning effects from simple scale economies. Indeed, what distinguishes the two is that learning by doing depends on both previous production volumes and on time. Note also in this context that although it may seem natural to assume c 2 (0, θ) = c 1 (θ ), our more general formulation allows for learning effects to accrue purely due to time (i.e., lower marginal costs without any first-period production).
(a) More efficient agent learns faster (b) Less efficient agent learns faster Example 1. Let second-period costs be given by c 2 (q 1 , θ) = c(θ ) − γ (θ )q 1 , with c strictly increasing in θ , and with c, γ > 0, and let the principal's objective function be given by S(q t ) = aq t − bq 2 t , where a, b > 0. Then more efficient agents learn faster if γ is increasing in θ , whereas less efficient agents learn faster if γ is decreasing in θ . 5
In what follows, we will consider different settings for negotiating the exchanged quantities and transfers. Common to these settings, however, is the usual assumption of full bargaining power resting with the principal: the principal offers a contract (or a choice of contracts) to the agent, which the agent can decide to accept or reject. If the agent rejects, he obtains a (type-independent) reservation payoff of zero and negotiations end.
The efficient full-information benchmark. As a point of comparison for our later analysis, we first consider the efficient full-information benchmark. Assume for a moment that the agent's type θ is known to the principal. For any output schedule q = (q 1 , q 2 ), the joint surplus of trade is then given by
(2)
Given his bargaining power and any known type θ , the informed principal will offer a contract (q * (θ ), z * (θ )) which is efficient, specifying production levels q * (θ ) = (q * 1 (θ ), q * 2 (θ )) which maximize joint surplus W (q; θ ), and payments z * (θ ) = (z * 1 (θ ), z * 2 (θ )) which leave the agent his reservation utility. 6 For later comparisons, we define conditional first-best output levels as follows: for any (q 2 , θ), letq * 1 (q 2 ; θ ) ≡ arg max q 1 W (q 1 , q 2 ; θ ) and, similarly, for any (q 1 , θ), letq * 2 (q 1 ; θ ) ≡ arg max q 2 W (q 1 , q 2 ; θ ).
Lemma 2.1. The first-best output schedule q * (θ ) and the conditional first-best output scheduleŝ q * 1 (q 2 ; θ ) andq * 2 (q 1 ; θ ) have the following properties: (a)q * 2 is increasing in both q 1 and θ ; (b)q * 1 is increasing in q 2 , is increasing in θ if more efficient agents learn faster, and is decreasing in θ if less efficient agents learn faster and c 1 = c 1 ; and (c) q * is increasing in θ if more efficient agents learn faster.
See the Appendix for the proof. As a general matter, we establish comparative static results such as Lemma 2.1 using supermodular analysis (cf Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Topkis, 1998) . This approach exploits 5 To make this example entirely compatible with our assumptions, the range of permissible q 1 and q 2 (i.e., Q 1 and Q 2 ) must be bounded from above so as to ensure S (q t ) > 0 and c 2 (q 1 , θ) > c 2 (q 1 , θ ) > 0. 6 Note that the first-best transfer schedule z * is not unique: if (q * , z * ) is a first-best contract, then any contract (q * ,z) with the same discounted value of transfers (i.e., withz 1 + δz 2 = z * 1 + δz * 2 ) will also be first best.
basic complementarity relations among arguments of the objective function and avoids imposing any unnecessary concavity assumptions on the objective. 7 The latter is particularly valuable in our setting. 8, 9 These technical issues aside, the intuition for the above results is conceivably simple: higher first-period output lowers the cost of additional second-period output, thereby raising incentives to expand the latter. Conversely, higher second-period output raises incentives to lower that output's costs through learning effects by expanding first-period output. Thus, each period's conditionally efficient output rises in the other period's output level. Moreover, a higher θ makes additional second-period output less costly, which is whyq * 2 is increasing in θ . Regarding the dependence ofq * 1 on θ , there are two effects. First, a higher θ makes first-period output cheaper, creating incentives to raise first-period output. Second, because of the impact of first-period output on second-period costs through learning effects, a higher θ creates incentives to raise (lower) firstperiod output if more (less) efficient agents learn faster. If more efficient agents learn faster, these two effects unambiguously complement each other, whereas if less efficient agents learn faster, a robust result obtains only if first-period costs are type independent (i.e., if the first effect is absent). Finally, concerning part (c), if more efficient agents also learn faster, the above effects complement each other, making q * rise in θ . Note that no such robust comparative result is available if the less efficient agent learns faster; even if c 1 = c 1 , a rise in θ provides direct incentives to raise q 2 and lower q 1 , which are counteracted, however, by the complementarity between q 1 and q 2 , leaving the overall result ambiguous.
Contracts under full commitment
In contractual problems with investment characteristics, the outcome is generally sensitive to the level of intertemporal commitment available to the principal (see, for instance, Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom, 1990) . In this section, we investigate our problem of learning by doing under the most extreme form of commitment: we assume that at the start of period 1 (but after the agent has learned his type), the principal can offer a contract which settles all future exchange and which cannot be reneged on.
Characterizing the optimal contract. The full-commitment setting has the convenient property that, by the revelation principle and the stationarity of private information, we may equivalently restrict our attention to truth-revealing mechanisms of the type q(θ ), z(θ ) θ ∈ which specify contracts (i.e., exchanged quantities and transfers) for each type, and where these contracts are designed so as to make it optimal for the agent to truthfully reveal his type. For any such contract, we let
denote the θ -type's equilibrium rent.
To relax notation in this section, for any function of θ ∈ {θ, θ}, we let an upper (lower) bar indicate that the function is evaluated at θ(θ ) and drop the argument θ . Thus, for instance, 7 Nonetheless, readers unfamiliar with this technique will quickly verify the results under additional concavity assumptions by means of the first-order approach. 8 More specifically, if c 2 is smooth and strictly decreasing in q 1 and if q 1 is not bounded from above, then we must have ∂ 2 c 2 /∂q 2 1 > 0 over some range simply because second-period costs are constrained to be nonnegative. 9 Supermodular analysis extends also to situations where optimizers are not unique. In this case, comparative static results are interpretable in terms of ordering relations among sets. Although all our results permit such an interpretation, to avoid tedious notation, we will be somewhat loose in distinguishing between the set of optimizers and its individual elements. Moreover, althogh comparative statics derived by this technique are very general in terms of covering also the possibility of corner solutions, this comes at the cost of all results applying only in a weak sense (i.e., "increasing" in Lemma 1 is to be read as "nondecreasing"). Because essentially all complementarity relations underlying our results are in fact strict, strict versions of our comparative static predictions are easily established for interior maximizers under mild additional conditions (see Edlin and Shannon, 1998 , for technical details). C RAND 2010.
U ≡ U (θ) and U ≡ U (θ). Finally, we let (q) ≡ [C 1 (q 1 ) + δC 2 (q 1 , q 2 )] − [C 1 (q 1 ) + δC 2 (q 1 , q 2 )] = q 1 (c 1 − c 1 ) + δq 2 [c 2 (q 1 ) − c 2 (q 1 )] (4) denote the cost advantage enjoyed by the θ -agent over the θ -agent for any output schedule q = (q 1 , q 2 ). Intuitively, this cost advantage measures the value of private information enjoyed by the more efficient θ -type. With this notation in place, the optimal contract under full commitment can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 3.1. The menu of contracts offered by the uninformed principal under full commitment is such that production schedules q SB and q SB solve
Transfers z SB and z SB are chosen such that types' equilibrium rents are U = (q SB ) and U = 0.
See the Appendix for the proof. Thus, structurally, the principal's optimization is the same as in the standard one-period model-except that he now chooses a vector of outputs q = (q 1 , q 2 ) for each type. This is easily understood by recognizing that, despite the presence of learning effects, sorting (i.e., which incentive constraint binds) is entirely driven by the assumption that c 1 and c 2 are decreasing in θ . Because this unambiguously makes the θ-agent more efficient, the relevant incentive problem is keeping him from falsely reporting θ by granting him a rent equal to his cost advantage (q) for the corresponding production schedule-and leaving the θ -agent a rent of zero by offering him a transfer which just covers his costs. Deducting these rents from joint surplus, the principal is left with reduced-form profits (i.e., incorporating the optimal choice of transfers z and z) of
maximization of which corresponds to condition (5). The objective function (6) embodies the usual rent-efficiency tradeoff faced by an uninformed principal: his menu of contracts balances expected joint surplus νW (q) + (1 − ν)W (q) against the expected rent payments ν (q) required to induce truthful reporting by the θ -type. This tradeoff leads to inefficiencies whose precise nature we analyze next.
Conditional distortionary incentives.
A trivial implication of Proposition 3.1 is the usual "no distortion at the top" result: in spite of information being private, the efficient θ -type still produces first-best quantities in both periods, so q SB = q * . This leaves us with an investigation of the nature of distortions "at the bottom", that is, of inefficiencies inherent in the contract offered to the inefficient θ -type.
The rent-efficiency tradeoff responsible for this distortion involves the simultaneous use of two screening instruments, q 1 SB and q 2 SB . To clarify their individual roles and make the principal's motives more transparent, we first analyze what we shall call "conditional" distortionary incentives. In analogy to the conditional first-best production schedulesq 1 * (q 2 ) andq 2 * (q 1 ), we let q 1 SB (q 2 ) andq 2 SB (q 1 ) denote the levels of q 1 and q 2 , respectively, which maximize W (q) − ν 1−ν (q) conditional on the other period's output level. With these definitions in place, the following conditional distortionary motives can be identified:
Proposition 3.2. Under full commitment, the uninformed principal faces the following (conditional) distortionary incentives in designing the θ -type's output schedule:
(a) Conditional on any first-period output q 1 , the uninformed principal will distort secondperiod output downward, soq 2 SB (q 1 ) q 2 * (q 1 ) for all q 1 ∈ Q 1 .
(b) Conditional on any second-period output q 2 , the uninformed principal will distort firstperiod output (i) downward, soq 1 SB (q 2 ) q 1 * (q 2 ) for all q 2 ∈ Q 2 , if the more efficient agent learns faster, and (ii) upward, soq 1 SB (q 2 ) q 1 * (q 2 ) for all q 2 ∈ Q 2 , if the less efficient agent learns faster and c 1 = c 1 .
See the Appendix for the proof. Part (a) is straightforward: given any first-period output level, second-period marginal costs c 2 are a datum, and hence the principal's optimization problem is identical to the standard one-period model of procurement with privately known and constant marginal costs, for which downward distortion (i.e., inefficiently low trade) is a well-known result.
More interestingly, part (b) identifies the distortionary incentives involved in choosing firstperiod output, and thereby the extent to which learning effects are exploited. Distortions in q 1 are again driven by the principal's incentive to reduce the more efficient type's informational rent. This rent in turn accrues for the agent being more efficient in both periods. As usual, the rent for lower first-period costs (the cost side of learning effects) is reduced by reducing first-period output, which introduces a downward distortionary incentive for q 1 . Through learning by doing, however, q 1 also affects second-period costs (the benefit side of learning effects), introducing a second distortionary motive. That the direction of this second distortion crucially depends on which agent learns faster is quickly understood by referring back to the illustration of the two relevant cases in Figure 1 : if the more efficient agent learns faster, decreasing q 1 reduces the cost disadvantage of the θ-type and hence the rent payable to the more efficient θ -type. Conversely, if the less efficient agent learns faster, the same effect is achieved by an increase in q 1 .
Overall, the conditional distortion in q 1 will therefore unambiguously be downward if the more efficient agent learns faster (Proposition 3.2(bi)), whereas the two motives will counteract if the less efficient agent learns faster, producing an unambiguous upward distortion only if uncertainty concerns the benefit side of learning effects exclusively (Proposition 3.2(bii)).
This last insight contrasts with the usual notion that informational asymmetries lead to inefficiently low levels of trade, and Lewis and Yildirim's (2002a) results concerning the regulation of a learning firm in particular. The intuition, however, is conceivably simple: distortions are always driven by the principal's desire to reduce the agent's informational rent. Whereas in most applications, rents will naturally rise with quantities traded, this is not necessarily the case under learning by doing. If learning effects tend to let inherently less efficient agents catch up, then informational rents may fall in output, giving the principal an incentive to procure inefficiently high quantities.
Overall distortions in output. The conditional distortions analyzed above provide a direct measure of the over-or underexploitation of learning effects by asking whether the uninformed principal's optimal contract can be Pareto improved upon by expanding or reducing first-period output. Because the principal ultimately distorts both periods' output schedules simultaneously, however, attaining the full welfare optimum will also require simultaneous adjustments in both quantities.
As the next result shows, if the more efficient type learns faster, attaining the full welfare optimum requires expanding both periods' output: conditional distortions in this case are representative of overall distortions, so overall trade is inefficiently low. are strictly concave. By the implied uniqueness of the maximizers and by Lemma 2.1, the conditional first-best output schedulesq 1 * (q 2 ) andq 2 * (q 1 ) are increasing functions. Moreover, concavity of W implies that theq 1 * -curve crosses theq 2 * -curve from below at q * = (q 1 * , q 2 * ) in (q 1 , q 2 )-space. Now, by Proposition 3.2(a), theq 2 SB -curve will lie south of theq 2 * -curve, and by Proposition 3.2(bi), theq 1 SB -curve will lie west of theq 1 * -curve. Hence, the equilibrium under private information-determined by the intersection of theq 2 SB -and theq 1 SB -curve-must lie in the shaded area in Figure 2 (a). As illustrated, this area must lie in the southwest quadrant of q * . The more basic intuition is that the downward distortionary incentives for both q 1 and q 2 reinforce each other through complementarities in the objective function.
Why an analogous argument fails when the less efficient agent learns faster is illustrated in Figure 2 (b). Again, theq 2 SB -curve must lie south of theq 2 * -curve. However, Proposition 3.2(bii) in this case tells us that there may be an upward distortion in first-period output given any second-period output, so that the new equilibrium may lie east of theq 1 * -curve. Consequently, only equilibria with q 1 SB < q 1 * and q 2 SB > q 2 * can be excluded. 10 Particularly, if the less efficient agent learns faster, it is possible for overall distortions to be upward in both periods, so that q 1 SB > q 1 * and q 2 SB > q 2 * . This is illustrated by the following extension to Example 1:
Example 2. Assume the value of output to the principal is given by S(q t ) = 100q t − 80q 2 t , cost structures are c 1 = c 1 = 75, c 2 (q 1 ) = 30 − 60q 1 , and c 2 (q 1 ) = 50 − 95q 1 , types are equally likely, and the common discount factor is δ = 0.7. First-best production then entails q * = (0.30, 0.55) and q * = (0.38, 0.54), whereas contracts under asymmetric information and full commitment will entail q SB = (0.49, 0.58) for the θ -type.
Alternative parameterizations of Example 1 will produce the other two possible directions in overall distortions.
Are learning effects exploited at all?
Having gauged the outcome under incomplete information against efficient benchmarks, this section investigates whether downward distortionary incentives concerning the inefficient type can be so severe as to eliminate the exploitation of learning effects altogether. For comparison, we consider the outcome which results if either 10 A simple generalization of this last argument (generalized beyond the graphical analysis's additional assumptions) runs as follows. Let q * denote the first-best output schedule (if the first-best output schedule is not unique, let q * denote any first-best schedule such that there exists no other first-best output schedule involving lower first-and higher second-period output). Then for any q = (q 1 , q 2 ) with q 1 < q 1 * and q 2 > q 2 * , we have W (q) < W (q * ). Moreover, (q) (q * ) for any such q because is decreasing in q 1 and increasing in q 2 . But then
, so that no such q can maximize the uninformed principal's objective in (5). (i) first-period output has no impact on second-period marginal costs, so ∂ ∂q 1 c 2 ≡ 0, or (ii) both principal and agent behave myopically, so δ = 0. In either case, the resulting choice of q 1 will maximize first-period virtual surplus S(q 1 ) − c 1 q 1 − ν 1−ν (c 1 − c 1 )q 1 alone, where the last term represents expected first-period informational rent payments. Motivated by this, we introduce the following terminology:
Equivalently (recall that S < 0), learning effects are exploited if the marginal returns to first-period output S (weakly) fall short of the virtual marginal costs c 1 + ν 1−ν (c 1 − c 1 ), and neglected if the reverse holds.
Obviously, first-best quantities always exploit learning effects. This need not be true for q 1 SB , the first-period quantity procured from the θ-type. The following result gives sufficient conditions for either case:
Proposition 3.5. The contract offered to the θ -agent exploits learning effects if
for all q 1 ∈ Q 1 ; it neglects learning effects if (7) is reversed for all q 1 ∈ Q 1 .
See the Appendix for the proof. Thus, learning effects are exploited if either the efficient agent does not learn too much faster than the inefficient agent, or if efficient types are scarce enough. Intuitively, both ensure that the principal's rent-efficiency trade-off puts sufficient weight on the efficiency goal-the former by reducing the efficient type's cost advantage and thereby his rent, the latter by making it less likely that such a rent will have to be paid in the first place.
In relation to our previous results in Section 3, Proposition 3.5 shows that even though downward distortions in q 1 may ensue if the inefficient agent learns faster, they will never be so strong as to eliminate the exploitation of learning effects altogether. In relation to the previous literature, Proposition 3.5 points out that this may, however, be the case if the efficient agent learns faster, depending on the distribution of types and how strongly learning rates differ. Particularly, the possibility of learning effects being neglected is absent in Lewis and Yildirim's (2002a) model.
Extensions and limitations.
The analysis above has relied on several simplifying assumptions. Before the next section proceeds to relax what might seem the most serious and restrictive one, namely the assumption of full commitment, we briefly discuss other possible extensions and the challenge they pose to our findings.
Varying learning advantages. Assuming that one of the agents unambiguously learns faster has simplified our identification of first-period distortions, but has been immaterial to the derivation of the optimal contract itself in Proposition 3.1. Without this assumption, it is still true that only the θ-type's output is distorted, q 2 is distorted downward given q 1 , but the direction of the distortion in q 1 given q 2 will be ambiguous, even if c 1 = c 1 .
More specifically, consider the cost functions shown in Figure 3 (a), where the more efficient θ-agent learns faster for q 1 < q 1 and slower for q 1 > q 1 . Moreover, assume for simplicity that c 1 = c 1 (letting c 1 < c 1 will simply add the aforementioned additional downward distortionary motive). Our characterization of partial distortions in q 1 is then still valid to the extent that they will be downward if q 1 < q 1 , and upward if q 1 > q 1 . However, which regime is relevant is ambiguous and depends, inter alia, on the value of output relative to its costs.
Intersecting cost curves. In contrast, the assumption that the θ -type has lower first-and secondperiod costs for any q 1 , q 2 has indeed been vital to our derivation of the optimal contract by C RAND 2010. 
(a) Agent with higher learning rate ambiguous (b) Agent with higher secondperiod costs ambiguous determining which of the incentive constraints must bind (formally, it ensures (q) 0, ∀q). However, this assumption precludes, for instance, the possibility of one agent "overtaking" the other due to learning effects. Such a case is illustrated in Figure 3 (b). Again assuming c 1 = c 1 for simplicity, a straightforward extension to our previous analysis shows that (partial) distortions in q 1 (θ B ) can only occur for q 1 (θ B ) < q 1 and will be upward, whereas distortions in q 1 (θ A ) can only occur for q 1 (θ A ) > q 1 and will be downward. However, which of these distortions occurs in the optimum is again ambiguous, and both may in fact occur simultaneously.
The previous two examples generalize the main theme of our above analysis in the following straightforward way: distortions, if they occur, aim at reducing the (locally) less efficient agent's cost disadvantage. Whether this requires an increase or a decrease in first-period output depends on relative learning rates.
Special cases of cost structures. Our general framework above has assumed that, prior to contracting, the agent privately learns a θ which affects both first-and second-period production costs (and, crucially, the learning rate by means of the latter). We have already commented on the special case in which θ affects only second-period costs (i.e., the case c 1 = c 1 ). Another special case arises if c 2 (q 1 ) = c 2 (q 1 ) for all q 1 , so that private information concerns the cost side of learning exclusively. In this case, informational rents accrue only for first-period production and, following the standard logic of the static model, it is obvious that learning effects will always be underexploited for the θ -type. Importantly, this special case also relates our findings to the previous literature on privately known learning effects, as it essentially corresponds to the setting considered by Lewis and Yildirim (2002a). 11 Alternative valuations of output. We have assumed that the principal values output at S(q 1 ) + δS(q 2 ). However, our key results concerning (partial) distortionary incentives in Proposition 3.2 are robust to more general valuation functionsS(q). 12 A particularly interesting extension involves lettingS depend on q 2 alone: in this case, our model represents a pure investment problem with 11 More specifically, in Lewis and Yildirim (2002a) , production costs in each period are the sum of an intrinsic and a transitory cost component. The intrinsic component depends on previous output in a way that is commonly known to both principal and agent. The transitory component is known only to the agent, but is independent across periods and, more importantly, independent of prior output. Thus, in Lewis and Yildirim's framework, there exists no informational asymmetry concerning the impact of today's output on tomorrow's cost. 12 Except for Proposition 3.5, all above results in fact easily generalize to cases in which the valuation functionS(q) displays complementarities in q 1 and q 2 in the sense that ∂ 2S /∂q 1 ∂q 2 0. To understand this, note that the analysis has employed the particular form of valuation function only to the extent that it implies additive separability of valuations in C RAND 2010. privately known returns, but where the level of investment is contractible. Reinterpreting our above results, underinvestment then ensues (in both a partial and an overall sense) if investment returns (in terms of cost savings) become more sensitive to private information with higher investment levels, whereas overinvestment (at least in a partial sense) occurs in the reverse case.
Contracts under spot commitment
The analysis thus far has assumed that, prior to first-period production, the principal can commit to a contract spanning both periods of production. There are several reasons why it is interesting to relax this assumption. First, it is quite conceivable that the principal indeed cannot find a way to commit not to renege after the first period, be this due to restrictions imposed by the legal system or simply because the regulatory authority's commitment is limited to the current administration's life span. 13 Second, limited commitment is generally understood to be a deterrent to long-term investments (cf Fudenberg et al., 1990) . It should be all the more interesting to see how our overinvestment result in particular stands up to limited commitment. Finally, because the immediately related literature (Lewis and Yildirim, 2002a, in particular) has focused on the case of limited commitment, it seems desirable for reasons of comparison to ensure that our findings concerning the possibility of an overexploitation of learning effects do not hinge on the assumption of full commitment.
We therefore assume in this section that parties are limited to spot contracts: at the beginning of each period t ∈ {1, 2}, the principal can offer a contract which specifies quantities q t and transfers z t only for this current period. The agent in turn can decline in each period, which yields him a reservation utility of zero and terminates the game.
An important concept in this dynamic setting is the rate at which agents disclose their information between periods 1 and 2. In particular, due to the well-known ratchet effect (see Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole, 1985; Laffont and Tirole, 1987) , limited commitment may make it suboptimal or even infeasible for the principal to have the agent fully disclose his information in period 1 already. Consequently, spot contracting requires us to consider an extended class of mechanisms which allow for the possibility of only partial revelation of information in period 1. The analytical complexity (and the added dimension of distortions in terms of the rate of information disclosure) makes it infeasible to derive explicit conditions similar to in Section 3 concerning the precise conditions under which an over-or underexploitation of learning effects occurs. However, the main result in this section shows that the principal's optimal choice of spot contracts can be formulated as a choice based on the same preferences as under full commitment-but among a reduced set of feasible allocations, this reduction being caused by q 1 and q 2 , which in turn implies that, due to cost-side effects alone, the surplus function W is complementary in q 1 and q 2 . Comparative static results reliant on this complementarity (i.e., Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 3.3) are thus robust to valuation functions which preserve this complementarity. 13 In the above two-period contract, reneging will be mutually beneficial after first-period production due to the usual interim inefficiencies (see, for instance, Laffont and Tirole, 1986) . It should be borne in mind, however, that the principal has incentives to find a commitment device because the ability to commit will always make him better off. the added requirement of sequential rationality. This implies in particular that, relative to welfare maximization, the principal's preferences will still display a bias toward allocations which reduce differences in second-period costs. A further interesting finding of our formal analysis is that, even as parties become arbitrarily patient, the principal may still find it optimal to induce types to fully reveal themselves in period 1 already-in contrast to Tirole's (1987, 1993) findings in a model without learning effects. Finally, we use numerical simulations to illustrate that, also under spot commitment, both up-and downward distortions in first-period output can occur. The numerical examples also illustrate, however, that an interpretation of these distortions is less straightforward than under full commitment, because distortions now occur also in the rate of information revelation.
Characterizing the optimal spot contracts. The aforementioned partial revelation of information in period 1 can be formalized by means of an extension to the classical revelation principle due to Bester and Strausz (2001) . By this extension, we may restrict ourselves to mechanisms in which the principal makes the exchanged quantities dependent on type reports θ t ∈ made in each period to date. In the second and final period, incentive constraints take the usual form, ensuring optimality of the agent reporting his true type. In contrast, the partial revelation of information in the first period takes the form of each type θ ∈ reporting his true type with some probability p 1 (θ ) > 0 which is strictly positive-but not necessarily equal to one. 14 A spot-contract equilibrium in our setting is therefore described by quantity schedules q 1 (θ 1 ) and q 2 (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) and transfer schedules z 1 (θ 1 ) and z 2 (θ 1 ,θ 2 ), which describe traded quantities and transfers for any history of reportsθ 1 ,θ 2 ∈ , and associated probabilities p 1 (θ ) > 0 with which each type θ ∈ reports his true type in period 1.
Next, in analogy to the full-commitment case, we may characterize rents optimally paid to each type in each period, thereby eliminating transfers from the principal's optimization program. To this end, let u 1 (θ 1 , θ) ≡ z 1 (θ 1 ) − c 1 (θ ) · q 1 (θ 1 ) and u 2 (θ 1 , θ) ≡ z 2 (θ 1 , θ) − c 2 [q 1 (θ 1 , θ), θ] · q 2 (θ 1 , θ) denote the first-and second-period equilibrium rents, respectively, of an agent of type θ who reportedθ 1 in the first period. Moreover, we let 1 (q 1 ) ≡ (c 1 − c 1 )q 1 and 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) ≡ [c 2 (q 1 ) − c 2 (q 1 )]q 2 denote the first-and second-period cost advantage, respectively, of the θover the θ -type (observe that 1 (q 1 ) + δ 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) ≡ (q 1 , q 2 ) given the (·)-function defined previously).
Consider first the second period. At the start of the second period, previous play has resulted in a reportθ 1 made by the agent. This report in turn determines (i) the agent's second-period marginal costs (via the first-period output invoked by the report), and (ii) an updated belief for the principal concerning the agent's true type, determined through Bayesian updating by comparing types' equilibrium reporting behavior p 1 (·) with the actual report made. Given these type-dependent marginal costs and beliefs, the second-period subgame is identical to the standard one-period framework, implying that second-period rents will be u 2 (θ 1 , θ) = 0 for the inefficient agent, and u 2 (θ 1 , θ ) = 2 [q 1 (θ 1 ), q 2 (θ 1 , θ)] for the efficient agent (a formal characterization of beliefs and optimal quantities is given in the Appendix). 15 14 There are three important differences between the classical revelation principle and that presented in Bester and Strausz (2001) : First, as noted, the extended revelation principle requires including also 'weakly truth-revealing' mechanisms in which agents reveal their true type only with a certain nonzero probability. Second, whereas the classical revelation principle contends that any incentive feasible mechanism can be replicated by a truth-revealing one, the extended revelation principle covers only incentive efficient ones (i.e., mechanisms such that there exists no other incentive feasible mechanism which yields a strictly higher payoff to the principal and the same payoff to the agent). The latter presents no restriction, however, if we are only interested in finding contracts which maximize the principal's profits. Finally, in terms of allocational outcomes, the procedure delivers a, but not necessarily all, mechanisms which maximize the principal's payoff. Particularly, although the principal cannot strictly increase his payoff with a richer message space, it does not preclude the existence of mechanisms with richer message spaces which permit the principal to achieve the same payoff. 15 Note that the fact that the agent can decline the contract (i.e., "run") in the second period invokes the participation constraints u 2 (θ, θ) 0, θ ∈ . Note further that there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to the principal Consider now the first period. Following the standard argument, the θ -type's first-period participation constraint can be neglected (it is implied by that of the θ-type and the θ -type's cost advantage), whereas that of the θ-agent must bind, so u 1 (θ , θ) = 0. Consequently, the first-period incentive constraints of the θand the θ -type, respectively, can be formulated as
where (8) must bind if p 1 (θ) < 1, and (9) must bind if p 1 (θ) < 1. Observe in particular that incentive compatibility implies the following necessary implementability condition on outputs:
(or, in short, [q 1 (θ), q 2 (θ, θ)] [q 1 (θ), q 2 (θ, θ)]). In analogy to Laffont and Tirole (1993) , we may distinguish three types of equilibria, depending on which of the incentive constraints bind (it is easy to see that leaving both incentive constraints slack can never be optimal for the principal):
• Type-I equilibrium: only the θ -type's incentive constraint (8) binds; • Type-II equilibrium: only the θ -type's incentive constraint (9) binds; • Type-III equilibrium: both types' incentive constraints bind.
Notably, type-I equilibria contain the subclass of fully separating equilibria, whereas type-III equilibria contain the subclass of fully pooling equilibria (i.e., equilibria involving no information revelation at all in period 1). Moreover, it can be shown that it is never optimal for the principal to leave (8) slack 16 :
Lemma 4.1. A type-II equilibrium can never be optimal for the principal.
See the Appendix for the proof. To understand the intuition for this result, observe first that in any type-II equilibrium, the only second-period quantity affected by a change in p 1 (θ) is q 2 (θ, θ). Next, observe that when choosing q 2 (θ, θ), the second-period principal fully internalizes the effect of this choice on rents payable to all θ -types (because all θ -types report their true type in a type-II equilibrium), so that the principal's choice of q 2 (θ, θ) in the second period is perfectly in line with his ex ante (i.e., first-period) objective. For these two reasons, an envelope-type result applies with respect to the choice of p 1 (θ): the first-order effect of raising/lowering p 1 (θ) corresponds to the sole effect of having the inefficient θ -type produce output schedule (q 1 (θ ), q 2 (θ , θ)) more/less often than (q 1 (θ), q 2 (θ, θ)). Hence, depending on whether the surplus obtained from a θ-type producing the first schedule is higher/lower than that if he produces the second schedule, it will be strictly profitable for the principal to marginally raise/lower p 1 (θ) in any such equilibrium.
By Lemma 4.1, the overall rent paid to the efficient type is [q 1 (θ ), q 2 (θ, θ)] in any equilibrium, whereas the inefficient type earns zero rent. We therefore obtain the following characterization of the optimal series of spot contracts:
Proposition 4.2. Under spot commitment, the principal optimally chooses p 1 (·) ∈ (0, 1], q 1 (·) and q 2 (·, ·) so as to maximize
offering contracts such that the agent participates, as a principal can always offer a contract which gives identical payoffs to both parties (one with z 2 = q 2 = 0). 16 This is an extension to Laffont and Tirole's (1993) Lemma 9.1. subject to (a) second-period quantities q 2 (·, ·) being sequentially optimal given first-period output and the updated beliefs 17 ; (b) the implementability condition (10), where p 1 (θ) = 1 if this constraint is slack.
Whereas Proposition 4.2 leaves open the exact nature of the equilibrium (i.e., whether type-I or type-III, and correspondingly the precise nature and rate of first-period information revelation), it reveals the underlying congruence in objectives and distortionary motives between the full-and the spot-commitment case: by Proposition 4.2, the principal maximizes the same objective function under spot commitment as under full commitment (see expression (6))-but now subject to constraints that represent both his own and the agent's sequential rationality. Although the constraints implied by spot commitment limit the principal to a smaller set of feasible contracts (and, generally, a different optimal contract), the basics of how learning effects are reflected in the principal's objectives are still the same. In particular, the last term in (11), the expected overall rent paid to a θ -type, reveals that relative to welfare maximization, the principal will still prefer an upward distortion in the inefficient type's first-period output if he learns faster, and a downward distortion otherwise.
The next result highlights a specific sense in which the set of feasible equilibria under spot commitment is indeed strictly smaller than under full commitment: Lemma 4.3. If c 1 = c 1 andq * 2 (0; θ ) > 0, there exist no fully separating equilibria. See the Appendix for the proof. Thus, under spot commitment, full revelation of information in the first period is quite generally only possible if the more efficient agent is also strictly more efficient in period 1in contrast to the full commitment case, where the optimum always involves full separation in period 1.
To understand Lemma 4.3, observe that under spot commitment, any fully separating equilibrium necessarily has both types getting a rent of zero in the second period, because the principal has fully learned the agent's type by then. However, any second-period contract under which the θ -type produces a (strictly) positive quantity will give the θ -type a strictly positive rent. Hence, unless the θ -type is shut down in the second period (sequential rationality of which requiresq * 2 (0; θ ) = 0), a θ -type can only be kept from lying in period 1 by leaving him a strictly positive first-period rent. However, if c 1 = c 1 , so there are no first-period cost differences, then this is not possible, because the θ -agent would then necessarily have an incentive to grab this rent by lying. 18 Lemma 4.3 establishes that fully separating equilibria can exist only if c 1 = c 1 . In turn, the following lemma gives a simple example involving c 1 = c 1 in which a fully separating equilibrium is indeed optimal: Lemma 4.4. For δ = 0 and c 1 = c 1 , a fully separating contract is optimal for the principal. This simply follows from the fact that, for δ = 0, the optimization problem underlying the first-period spot contract is identical to the standard one-period model-for which we know the optimal contract involves full separation.
Whereas Lemma 4.4 concerns the optimal contract structure for the polar case of complete discounting of the future, the following result concerns the optimal contract structure for the opposite polar case in which the discount factor becomes very large. To keep the analysis simple (and in keeping with previous results in the literature), we restrict our attention to comparing the polar cases of fully separating and fully pooling contracts.
Lemma 4.5.
(a) Suppose that the inefficient agent learns faster and that lim q 1 →∞ [c 2 (q 1 ) − c 2 (q 1 )] > 0.
Then, for δ large enough, the principal strictly prefers the optimal fully pooling contract to any fully separating contract. (b) Suppose that the efficient agent learns faster, that ∂c 2 /∂q 1 = 0 (so the inefficient agent does not learn at all), and that c 2 (0) = c 2 (0). 19 Then, for δ large enough, the principal strictly prefers the optimal fully separating contract to any fully pooling contract.
See the Appendix for the proof.
To relate this result to the existing literature, note that it has previously been shown that absent any learning effects, the principal strictly prefers pooling to full separation for δ large enough (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993) . By part (a) this result extends to situations in which the inefficient agent learns faster (but remains strictly less efficient at the limit). Using a specific example, part (b) illustrates, however, that this result does not extend to situations in which the efficient agent learns faster. 20 To develop the intuition for Lemma 4.5, observe first that for fixed second-period costs, the principal's ex ante expected profits from second-period trade (in the case of the separating contract, this includes first-period rent payments for second-period cost advantages) are strictly higher under a fully pooling contract than under a fully separating one. This is because full separation involves an adverse ratchet effect: in the second period, when choosing q 2 (θ, θ), the principal does not take into account the impact on the rent payable to the efficient agent for revealing himself in period 1. In contrast, under a fully pooling contract, as no information is revealed in period 1, the principal's objective in the second period is perfectly aligned with his ex ante objective in the first period. As δ grows large, this second-period superiority of pooling contracts outweighs any first-period drawbacks from having type-independent first-period output.
When learning effects are present, first-period output directly affects second-period costs and thereby second-period payoffs. By this direct effect, the choice of first-period output remains asymptotically relevant even as δ → ∞. However, if the inefficient agent learns faster, both the optimal separating and the optimal pooling contract will involve setting arbitrarily high firstperiod output levels as δ grows large, in order to reduce second-period costs as well as to reduce the efficient type's cost advantage 2 (q), which is part of the rent accruing to the efficient type. Hence, second-period marginal costs for either type of agent will necessarily converge to their respective minimum under either type of contract. Consequently, types' marginal costs under either type of optimal contract are asymptotically identical, and the above intuition concerning the dominance of pooling contracts still goes through. This is the key intuition for part (a).
In contrast, when the efficient agent learns faster, the incentive to raise first-period output as δ grows in order to reduce second-period costs is counteracted by an incentive to reduce q 1 so as to reduce 2 (q). Separation may then prove profitable in order to reap this benefit of a low q 1 without having to endure the efficiency loss associated with a correspondingly low q 1 under a pooling contract. The setting of part (b), illustrated in Figure 4 , provides an extreme example of this: if the inefficient agent does not learn at all, then setting q 1 = 0 entails no second-period efficiency loss and minimizes 2 (q). Under a fully separating contract, the principal can fully exploit this while at the same time keeping the efficient agent's first-period output q 1 at its efficient levelsomething that is not possible with a pooling contract. Generally, this advantage of separation Note: Row "Probability" shows probability of observing quantity in spot equilibrium; row "Spot contract (SC)" shows quantities in equilibrium spot contract; remaining rows are explained in the text. must be traded off against the aforementioned costs of the ratchet effect. In the example, however, because c 2 (0) = c 2 (0), we have 2 (q) = 0 for q 1 = 0, so that the ratchet effect disappears, which unambiguously makes separation preferable.
Numerical simulations. By formalizing the optimization problem faced by the principal under spot commitment, the above analysis has shown that, compared to welfare maximization, the principal's preferences feature the same basic concern for using learning effects to reduce second-period cost differences as under full commitment, but that the choice set necessarily comprises more complex contracts involving only partial first-period revelation and constraints on sequential rationality. The complexity of the choice set (and the fact that distortions now occur along a third dimension, namely the rate of information revelation) makes it infeasible to derive results concerning the direction of distortions at the same level of generality as in Section 3 for the full-commitment case. However, to illustrate our point that both up-and downward distortions can occur under spot commitment, this section presents the optimal spot contracts for two specific examples.
Example 3: Inefficient agent learns faster. We first consider an example in which the inefficient agent learns faster, which we know under full commitment causes the inefficient agent's firstperiod output to be inefficiently high-at least given second-period output. Specifically, we use the same setting used in Example 2 in Section 3 to illustrate the possibility of overall upward distortions under full commitment:
Example 3. For the setting given in Example 2, the optimal sequence of spot contracts is a type-III equilibrium where reporting strategies are given by p 1 (θ ) = 1 and p 1 (θ ) = 0.74, and equilibrium output menus are given by q 1 (θ ) = 0.34, q 1 (θ ) = 0.44, q 2 (θ, θ ) = 0.57, q 2 (θ, θ ) = 0.60, q 2 (θ, θ) = 0.58, and q 2 (θ, θ) = 0.32. 21
As noted, there are multiple ways to gauge distortions in the spot contract of Example 3 (comparisons are summarized in Table 1) :
Comparison with unconstrained first best (q * 1 , q * 2 ). First-best quantities as described in Section 2 are shown in the third row of Table 1 . Distortions are easy to evaluate for the θ-type because he produces deterministic quantities in the spot equilibrium (recall p(θ) = 1): his output is higher under the spot contract than under the first best. Comparisons are complicated for the θ-agent by his equilibrium quantities under the spot contract being stochastic. However, his average first-period quantity p 1 (θ)q 1 (θ) + (1 − p 1 (θ))q 1 (θ ) = 0.42 exceeds q * 1 (θ), whereas his average second-period output of 0.51 falls short of q * 2 (θ ). Average overall second-period output (i.e., averaged over both agents and reports) under the spot contract (0.54) is higher, however, than average first-best second-period output (0.52).
Comparison with first best conditional on first-period reporting (q * 1 , q * 2 | p SC 1 ). Next, efficient levels of q 1 (·) and q 2 (·) given agents reporting strategies under the spot contract are given in the fourth row of Table 1 . Compared to this benchmark, there is a clear upward distortion in both agents' period output and the θ -type's second-period output. The direction of the distortion in the θ-type's second-period output depends on his first-period report, but the average distortion under the spot contract is again upward.
Comparison with efficient first-period output conditional on first-period reporting and secondperiod output (q * 1 | p SC 1 , q SC 2 ). The fifth row of Table 1 shows that given (i) agents' reporting strategies and (ii) second-period output, both types' first-period output is inefficiently high under spot contracting.
Comparison with efficient second-period output conditional on first-period reporting and firstperiod output (q * 2 | p SC 1 , q SC 1 ). The last line of Table 1 shows that there is no distortion in the θ-agent's second-period output given his first-period output. Moreover, because p 1 (θ) = 1 and therefore ν 2 (θ) = 0, the θ -agent's second-period output is also efficient under truthful reporting by this measure, whereas it is inefficiently low for a θ -report.
Example 4: Efficient agent learns faster. To round off this section of numerical examples, Example 4 below presents a setting in which the more efficient agent also learns faster. As one may expect, results in this example are less surprising in that the spot equilibrium entails unambiguous downward distortion in quantities traded:
Example 4. Assume the value of output to the principal is given by S(q t ) = 100q t − 80q 2 t , cost structures are c 1 = 75, c 2 (q 1 , θ ) = 60 − 70q 1 , and c 2 (q 1 , θ) = 65 − 60q 1 , ν = 0.5, and δ = 0.7. The spot equilibrium then involves full pooling (i.e., no revelation of information in the first period) with q 1 = 0.237, and second-period outputs (contingent only on second-period reports) of q 2 (θ ) = 0.354 and q 2 (θ) = 0.262. Table 2 . 22 Relative to all benchmarks, outputs are distorted downward in the equilibrium spot contract.
Comparisons of output distortions are shown in

Conclusion
Our model has analyzed how the introduction of privately known learning capabilities into the standard dynamic model of adverse selection influences incentive design. Contrary to previous work by Lewis and Yildirim (2002a) , we have considered a setting in which agents are privately informed about the rate at which they learn rather than just the cost side.
The focus of our investigation has been on whether this information being private leads to an under-or overexploitation of learning effects relative to the efficient level. Under full commitment, we have shown that this crucially depends on whether learning effects let inherently more efficient agents expand their lead, or whether they enable inherently less efficient agents to catch up. In the first case, we obtain results similar to Lewis and Yildirim's in that learning effects will be underexploited-the only difference being that in our case, this distortion can be so strong as to eliminate the exploitation of learning effects altogether. In the second case, we obtain entirely new results: if learning effects let inherently less efficient agents catch up, the principal has an incentive to overexploit learning effects. Moreover, we have shown that this effect is not driven by the full-commitment assumption: an overexploitation of learning effects may result also under spot commitment, despite the general notion that limited commitment tends to deter rather than encourage long-term investments.
More generally, our analysis has shown that in order to predict an under-or overexploitation of learning effects in dynamic adverse selection settings, it is important to identify whether these learning effects serve to magnify or to diminish existing differences in efficiency between types. Concerning vertical procurement relationships, for instance, we may seek to categorize supplying industries along these lines according to their technology. For instance, consider rather simple low-tech inputs produced in more traditional "bread-and-butter" industries where there is little scope for large technological improvements. Even if there is originally some scope for improvements through learning by doing, we would eventually expect all agents to "catch on to the trick" (some types sooner, some later), after which there is little scope for further improvement. Thus, we would expect learning effects to quickly subside and to equalize agents' productivity. In such industries, our model would predict learning effects to be over-rather than under-exploited. In contrast, consider suppliers of more high-tech products such as the computer chip industry. Here, we would expect significant scope for long-run improvements in production technologies. Further, we would expect inherently more innovative and creative suppliers to ever increase their lead over less efficient suppliers through accumulated learning effects. For such suppliers, our model predicts learning effects to be under-rather than overexploited. Similar technological arguments may be applied to the regulation of monopolistic suppliers.
One may also imagine applications of our model outside of the realm of pure procurement and regulation settings. Take, for instance, labor contracts of the type considered in Miyazaki's (1977) "internal labor market rat race," where employees' productivity on the job is privately known, and labor contracts specify how hard an agent is expected to work on the job. Assume, in addition, that how hard an agent works today influences his future productivity on the job. If we expect hard work to make a less efficient worker catch up with the more efficient worker's productivity, we should expect the employer to ask agents to work inefficiently hard on the job-essentially, aggravating the "rat race." If, on the other hand, we expect harder work today to magnify productivity differences between workers (as might be the case on more creative jobs), we should expect the employer to relax workers' workload below the efficient level.
Other potential fields of application may include credit market problems in the style of Freixas and Laffont (1990) , where the borrower is privately informed about the returns to his project. If the project's future returns systematically depend on the size of the loan today, then our analysis would predict inefficiently high first-period loans if raising loans has a larger impact on productivity in inherently less productive projects, and vice versa if productivity in inherently more productive projects is more strongly affected. Finally, the insights may be applied to models of discrimination in quantity or quality by a monopolistic supplier of a consumption good (see Maskin and Riley, 1984; Mussa and Rosen, 1978) if we assume that consumers get used to or even addicted to the good, so that consuming more (or a higher quality) of the good today increases consumers' willingness to pay tomorrow. 23 The learning-speed criterion of our model then pertains to whether customers with a higher willingness to pay for the good also get used to the good faster, or whether it is the customers who value the good less who get used to it at a faster rate. Our analysis predicts an underexploitation of the "addiction factor" in the former case, and an overexploitation in the latter. subject to (A6). Due to the additively separable structure and because ν ∈ (0, 1), this is equivalent to condition (5). To complete the proof, it therefore remains to be shown that any {q, q} satisfying (5) also satisfy (A6). The former implies in particular that
Because W (q) − W (q) = (q) for any q by the definition of W and W , the inequalities in (A8) may be added to yield (qν)/(1 − ν) (qν)/(1 − ν), which implies (A6).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We again employ supermodular analysis to derive the results. To this end, define the real-valued function g(q; τ ) such that
(a) For any q,
which is strictly negative (see the definition of ). Thus, for any q 1 , g has strictly decreasing differences in q 2 and τ , implying that arg max q2 g(q 1 , q 2 ; τ ) is decreasing in τ for any q 1 . By definition of g, this set corresponds to the conditional second period first best for τ = 0 and to the conditional second period second best for τ = 1, which proves the claim.
(b) For any q,
Thus, whenever the more efficient agent learns faster, g has decreasing differences in q 1 and τ for any q 2 (and strictly so for any q 2 > 0), which proves claim (bi). On the other hand, whenever the less efficient agent learns faster and c 1 = c 1 , g has increasing differences in q 1 and τ for any q 2 , which establishes part (bii).
Proof of Proposition 3.3. We again employ the auxiliary function g(q; τ ) defined in (A9) in the proof of Proposition 2, so that q * ∈ arg max q g(q; 0) and q SB ∈ arg max q g(q; 1). As established there, for the case at hand, g has strictly decreasing differences in q 2 and τ for any q 1 , and strictly decreasing differences in q 1 and τ for any q 2 > 0. Hence, g has strictly decreasing differences in (q, τ) . Moreover, g is supermodular in q for τ = 0 because W is supermodular in q (see the proof of Proposition 2.1). Hence, the set of maximizers of g is decreasing in τ , which proves the claim. 24
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Observe first thatq 1 SB (0) = q • 1 because the principal's optimal choice of q 1 conditional on q 2 = 0 simply maximizes expected first-period surplus minus expected first-period rent payments. Moreover,q 1 SB (q SB 2 ) = q SB 1 by definition of the full and conditional optima. Because q SB 2 0, learning effects will thus be exploited ifq 1 SB (q 2 ) is increasing in q 2 , and unexploited if it is decreasing. This in turn depends on whether the principal's objective W − ν 1−ν has increasing or decreasing differences in (q 1 , q 2 ). Using the definitions of W and , we have
so that the former will be the case whenever condition (7) holds (and the latter whenever (7) is reversed), which completes the proof.
Proofs of results in Section 4.
To establish Lemma 4.1, we first provide a formal description of the second-period continuation equilibrium. First, letting ν 2 (θ 1 ) denote the principal's belief that the agent is of type θ if he sent signalθ 1 in period 1, Bayesian updating immediately implies the following:
Lemma A1. For any reporting strategies p 1 (·) and first-period signalθ 1 , the principal's second-period beliefs are given by
,θ 1 = θ,
24 Note that supermodularity of g in q for τ = 1 is not required for the proof (and not generally satisfied). The interested reader is invited to verify that, given a binary parameter space, Theorem 2.8.1 in Topkis (1998) in fact requires supermodularity of the objective for only one of the two parameter values: together with increasing differences, this is easily seen to imply Topkis' condition (2.8.1), which produces the result by Lemma 2.8.1.
Next, given first-period quantities and the principal's second-period beliefs, the second period corresponds to the standard one-period model, establishing the following result on second-period quantities and rents:
Lemma A2. For any first-period strategies q 1 (·), z 1 (·), p 1 (·) and any first-period reportθ 1 , the second-period continuation contract q 2 (θ 1 , θ), z 2 (θ 1 , θ) must be such that (a) outputs q 2 (θ 1 , θ) satisfy
where ν 2 (θ 1 ) is determined by (A12), (b) transfers z 2 (θ 1 , θ) are such that u 2 (θ 1 , θ) = 0 and u 2 (θ 1 , θ) = 2 [q 1 (θ 1 ), q 2 (θ 1 , θ)].
Moreover, for ν 2 (θ 1 ) > 0, any q 2 (θ 1 , θ) which satisfies (A13) and (A14) will satisfy (A15). Next, we establish the following properties of the second-period continuation outcome as described by Lemma A2:
Lemma A3. For any first-period strategies q 1 (·), z 1 (·) and any first-period reportθ 1 , (a) if ν 2 (θ 1 ) ∈ (0, 1), the set of q 2 (θ 1 , ·) which satisfy Lemma A2 is unique. Denoting this solution byq 2 (θ 1 , ·), botĥ q 2 (θ 1 , θ) and 2 [q 1 (·),q 2 (θ 1 , θ)] are continuous and strictly decreasing in ν 2 (θ 1 ) whenever 2 [q 1 (·),q 2 (θ 1 , θ)] > 0; (b) if ν 2 (θ 1 ) = 1, then 2 [q 1 (θ 1 ), q 2 (θ 1 , θ)] = 0 for any q 2 (θ 1 , θ) satisfying Lemma A2.
Proof of Lemma A3. (a) Note first that the objective function is strictly concave for ν 2 (θ 1 ) ∈ (0, 1) due to the assumption that S < 0 and the linearity of the second-period cost function (and thereby 2 ) in q 2 . This implies uniqueness, continuity, and validity of the first-order approach for interior solutions to condition (A13) in Lemma A2. Dropping the conditioning onθ 1 , the first-order condition for q 2 (θ) is
(Note that the first-order condition must bind because 2 > 0 implies that q 2 (θ ) > 0.) Because 2 > 0, c 2 (q 1 , θ) − c 2 (q 1 , θ ) > 0, so that the right-hand side of (A16) is strictly increasing in ν 2 . With the assumption that S < 0, the claim that q 2 (θ) is strictly increasing immediately follows. Moreover, for 2 > 0, 2 is strictly increasing in q 2 (θ), which proves the second claim.
(b) For ν 2 (θ 1 ) = 1, the principal attaches no probability to the agent being of type θ and therefore-by condition (A14) in Lemma A2-will set q 2 (θ 1 , θ) with the sole objective of eliminating the θ-agent's rent, which he can always achieve by setting q 2 (θ 1 , θ) = 0, so that 2 [q 1 (θ 1 ), q 2 (θ 1 , θ)] = 0.
With these results in place, we may now prove Lemma 4.1:
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Note first that a type-II contract with p 1 (θ) = 1 (i.e., a fully separating one) can never be optimal because it is strictly dominated by a fully separating type-I contract with the same quantities-but which gives a lower rent to the θ-agent.
Thus, consider any type-II equilibrium with p 1 (θ) < 1. Let S ≡ {p 1 , q 1 , q 2 } denote the corresponding strategies. 25 We will show that S cannot maximize the principal's expected payoff by arguing that his profits can be strictly increased by either raising or lowering p 1 (θ). To this end, consider the strategies S ≡ {p 1 , q 1 , q 2 }, which differ from S only in p 1 (θ) and q 2 (θ, θ): choose p 1 (θ) = p 1 (θ) and q 2 (θ, θ) such that it satisfies Lemma A2 (i.e., sequential rationality), and that S satisfies the implementability condition (10), that is, that
Moreover, note that, by Lemma A3 (continuity of q 2 (·) in the principal's beliefs), and because the implementability condition is slack for the original contract S by presumption, the set of such S is nonempty and contains 25 To ease notation, we suppress the strategies z 1 and z 2 . Note that for any p 1 , q 1 , q 2 , second-period rents are determined by Lemma A2, and optimal first-period rents satisfy U (θ ) = 0 and U (θ) = [q 1 (θ), q 2 (θ, θ)] (by the fact that the θ-type's incentive constraint binds) which in turn implicitly determines the corresponding strategies z 1 , z 2 . C RAND 2010. both S with p 1 (θ) > p 1 (θ) as well as such with p 1 (θ) < p 1 (θ ) (the former by choosing p 1 (θ) − p 1 (θ) > 0 small enough). 26 By construction, S is incentive compatible, 27 so that we may proceed to compare the payoffs resulting under S and S . To avoid tedious notation and make the proof more transparent, for any strategy set S and any first-period report θ 1 and type θ , we let W 1 (θ 1 , θ) ≡ S[q 1 (θ 1 )] − c 1 (θ )q 1 (θ 1 ) and W 2 (θ 1 , θ) ≡ S[q 2 (θ 2 , θ)] − c 2 [q 1 (θ 1 ), θ]q 2 (θ 2 , θ) denote the first-and second-period surplus generated by an agent of type θ who reportsθ 1 in the first period (and truthfully in the second). Similarly, we letˆ 1 (θ 1 ) ≡ 1 [q 1 (θ 1 )],ˆ 2 (θ 1 ) ≡ 2 [q 1 (θ 1 ), q 2 (θ 1 , θ)] andˆ (θ 1 ) ≡ˆ 1 (θ 1 ) +ˆ 2 (θ 1 ) denote the first-period-, second-period-, and overall cost advantage enjoyed by the θ-type over the θ -type for the latter's contract, upon having reportedθ 1 in period 1. Moreover, we let (S) denote the principal's expected profits under S.
Using this "reduced form" the principal's difference in profits between S and S may be written as
By (A18), the difference in payoffs between S and S may be decomposed into (i) the effect of the increase in p 1 (θ) (first term on right-hand side), and (ii) the effect of the ensuing decrease in q 2 (θ, θ) (second term).
To obtain a lower bound on the second term, we use the fact that q 2 (θ, θ) must be sequentially optimal in S as described in Lemma A2, with ν 2 (θ) = ν/[ν + (1 − p 1 (θ))(1 − ν)] and q 1 (θ) = q 1 (θ), so q 2 (θ, θ) ∈ arg max q2 (1 − ν)(1 − p 1 (θ))δ[S(q 2 ) − c 2 [q 1 (θ), θ]q 2 ] − ν 2 [q 1 (θ), q 2 ],
which implies in particular that
Inequality (A20) is strict due to the result that maximizers of (A19) are unique and strictly increasing in p 1 (θ) by Lemma A3. Hence, letting κ ≡ [W 1 (θ, θ) + δW 2 (θ, θ)] − [W 1 (θ, θ) + δW 2 (θ, θ)] denote the increase in discounted surplus from an agent of type θ reporting truthfully rather than lying under S , we have
Thus, depending on the sign of κ , the principal can always strictly increase his profits by either raising or lowering p 1 (θ), and we have argued above that either is possible, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Under any fully separating equilibria, we have ν 2 (θ) = 1, so that sequential rationality implies 2 [q 1 (θ), q 2 (θ, θ)] = 0. Furthermore, 1 (q 1 ) = 0, ∀q 1 , because c 1 = c 1 . Consequently, the implementability condition (10) implies 2 [q 1 (θ), q 2 (θ, θ)] 0. Because 2 (·) 0 by our model assumptions, this in turn implies 2 [q 1 (θ), q 2 (θ, θ)] = 0, which can only be true if q 2 (θ, θ) = 0. In turn, setting q 2 (θ, θ) = 0 must be sequentially rational for the principal in period 2 given that he believes to encounter a θ-type with probability 1, so we must haveq * 2 [q 1 (θ); θ] = 0. Becauseq * 2 [q 1 , θ] is strictly increasing in q 1 by Lemma 2.1, there can exist such a q 1 (θ) if and only ifq * 2 (0; θ) = 0, as claimed. Proof of Lemma 4.5. Note first that, for both fully pooling and fully separating contracts, equilibrium first-and secondperiod quantities produced by either type are deterministic. Letting q = (q 1 , q 2 ) and q = (q 1 , q 2 ) denote types' respective equilibrium quantity profiles, the principal's payoff under either type of contract can be expressed as
Moreover, using Proposition 4.2, the principal's respective expected payoffs from the optimal pooling contract and the optimal fully separating contract can be found by maximizing (A22) subject to certain constraints on q, q, which embody the constraints of sequential rationality of q 2 (·) and implementability. Before stating these constraints, observe first that for any given constraint set C ⊆ (Q 1 × Q 2 ) 2 , average payoffs satisfy 28 
Now, for any δ, the optimal fully separating contract will maximize (A22) subject to q, q satisfying the constraints q 2 =q * 2 (q 1 ; θ) and (A24) 1 (q 1 ) + δ 2 [q 1 ,q * 2 (q 1 ; θ)] 1 (q 1 ),
where (A24) represents the constraint from second-period rationality and (A25) represents the implementability condition. The optimal fully pooling contract in turn will maximize (A22) subject to the constraint 29
For any δ, let i (δ), i ∈ {FS, P} denote the expected payoff from the optimal fully separating contract and the optimal fully pooling contract, respectively. Moreover, let π i ≡ lim δ→∞ 1 1+δ i (δ) denote the limiting average payoff under either type of contract as δ → ∞. Then, to show that there exists aδ such that i (δ) > j (δ) for all δ >δ, it suffices to show that the corresponding limiting average payoffs satisfy π i > π j .
(a) For the fully pooling contract, using (A23), we have
whereas for the fully separating contract, we have π FS sup q,q {νW 2 (q) + (1 − ν)W 2 (q) − ν 2 (q)} s.t. q 2 =q * 2 (q 1 ; θ).
The latter inequality follows from the fact that ignoring the implementability condition (A25) cannot result in a lower average payoff (and hence limit) than that attained in the fully separating contract. Now, because W 2 is strictly increasing in q 1 , W 2 is strictly increasing in q 1 , and 2 is strictly decreasing in q 1 (the latter due to the assumption that the inefficient agent learns faster), the supremum in (A27) involves letting q 1 , q 1 → ∞. Consequently, the constraint in (A27) does not affect the value of the supremum. In contrast, restriction in (A28) will result in a strictly lower value of the supremum than in the unrestricted problem. To see this, note that for q 1 , q 1 → ∞, we have c 2 q 1 → c 2 • and c 2 (q 1 ) → c 2 • , 30 so that attaining the unrestricted supremum requires q 2 = arg max q2 {(1 − ν)(S(q 2 ) − c 2 • q 2 ) − ν(c 2 • − c 2 • )q 2 }, whereaŝ q * 2 (q 1 , θ) q1→∞ −→ arg max q2 (1 − ν)(S(q 2 ) − c 2 • q 2 ). Hence, π FS < π P , which establishes the claim. (b) To characterize the limiting average payoff from the optimal fully separating contract, consider the class of fully separating contracts which has q 1 = 0. Because c 2 (0) = c 2 (0) by presumption, 2 (q) = 0 for this class of contracts. Hence, the implementability condition (A25) collapses to q 1 q 1 = 0, and can therefore be ignored. Considering the limiting optimal average payoff from the optimal contract in this subclass as δ → ∞, we obtain π FS sup q,q
that is, this class of contracts is asymptotically second-period efficient. In contrast, for the optimal pooling contract,
It is easy to see that, because 2 (q) > 0 for q 1 > 0 and q 2 > 0, (A30) falls strictly short of the right-hand side of (A29). Hence, π FS > π P , from which the claim follows. 28 This holds because ν[W 1 (q 1 ) − 1 (q 1 )] + (1 − ν)W 1 (q 1 ) and ν[W 2 (q) − 2 (q)] + (1 − ν)W 2 (q) are both bounded from above. 29 Notice that, under a fully pooling contract, the principal learns no information in the first period, so that his objectives when choosing output levels in the second period are identical to his ex ante objectives. Hence, sequential rationality poses no relevant constraint on his maximization problem. Moreover, the implementability condition is trivially satisfied for any pooling contract. 30 Both limits c 2 • and c 2 • exist because second-period marginal costs are bounded below at zero and because c 2 (q 1 , θ) is nonincreasing in q 1 . C RAND 2010.
